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Agency Problems in Motor Carrier Cases

S

Craig Spatngenberg*

SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS apply to the problems of agency
in cases involving motor carriers. The questions here presented are viewed in the light of the operating practices which
obtain in the industry.
Relatively few tractor-trailer or truck-trailer outfits are
owned by the certified carrier. The equipment is usually owned
by an individual, who may drive it himself as an owner-driver;
or may hire his own driver and lease the equipment and driver
together to the carrier. The lease may be for a single movement
only, covering one trip from a stated origin to a stated terminal;
or may be for a longer term. The long term leases are usually
for one year, subject to cancellation on written notice by either
party.
There seems to be no standard form of either single trip or
long term lease. Some carriers reserve exclusive possession and
control over the equipment and the driver; and some expressly
disclaim right of control, designating the owner as an independent contractor and the driver as the servant of the owner alone.
Although the form of lease may control the rights and liabilities
as between the owner, operator, and the certificated carrier, it
does not control rights and liabilities as between the carrier and
such third persons as shippers, consignees, and travelers upon
the highway.
Generally speaking, the carrier has the liability of a master
for all conduct of the driver, as though he were a servant, if the
conduct occurs in the course of the transportation service of the
carrier. There are two different approaches which reach this
same end. One concept is that there is a valid independent contract between the carrier and the owner-driver, but the carrier
is nevertheless liable for the conduct of its hired contractor on
the ground that it cannot delegate its duties nor its responsibility in an activity which it can carry on only by virtue of a
franchise granted to it, and to it alone, by the public at large.
This concept is well expressed in the Restatement, Law of
Torts, Sec. 428:
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"An individual or a corporation carrying on an activity
which can be lawfully carried on only under a franchise
granted by public authority and which involves an unreasonable risk of harm to others, is subject to liability for
bodily harm caused to such others by the negligence of a
contractor employed to do the work carrying on this activity."
It is sometimes said that the relation between carrier and
owner-driver is, as a matter of law, deemed to be that of principal and agent, or master and servant, so that the liability of
the carrier would follow traditional respondeat superior doctrines. The Ohio Supreme Court recently announced this as its
view in Thornberry v. Oyler Brothers, Inc.,' but the statement
of the rule must be qualified. It is limited to situations involving
the rights of third persons against the carrier. Ohio clearly
recognized that the carrier could create an independent contractor relationship with the owner-driver in Commercial Motor
Freight, Inc. v. Ebright,2 where it was held that the driver was
not a servant under the lease involved therein for Workmen's
Compensation purposes, even though he would be deemed a
servant so far as the general public was concerned.
The difference in the rights accorded the various parties involved depends on their status, as is clearly illustrated in War
Emergency Co-op Assn. v. Widenhouse.8 There the lessor's
driver, delivering a cargo of gasoline to a filling station, negligently caused the gasoline to explode, damaging the filling station and the truck, and injuring two persons. It was held that
the carrier was liable for the injuries to the public, even though
the driver was an independent contractor.
The owner of the equipment contended that he could recover for his property damage, on the ground 'that the driver
was to be deemed a servant of the carrier as a matter of law.
Held, not so. As between the owner-lessor and the carrier, the
independent contract was recognized, and the driver held to be
an employee of the owner-lessor for whose negligence the owner
himself, and not the carrier, was liable.
In cases where the carrier is operating under certificate
granted by the Interstate Commerce Commission, the rules of
the Commission govern. In 1936, the Bureau of Motor Carriers,
1 Thornberry v. Oyler Brothers, 164 Ohio St. 395, 131 N. E. 2d 383 (1955).
2 Commercial Motor Freight, Inc. v. Ebright, 143 Ohio St. 127, 54 N. E. 2d
297 (1944).
3 War Emergency Co-Op Assn. v. Widenhouse, 169 F. 2d 403 (C. C. A. 4,
No. Car., 1948).
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an agency of the Commission, announced
Rule No. 4, as follows:

its Administrative

"Question: Under what circumstances may a carrier add
to its equipment by leasing a vehicle and obtaining services
of an owner driver?
"Answer: The lease or other arrangement by which the
equipment of an authorized operator is augmented must be
of such a character that the possession and control of the
vehicle is, for the period of the lease, entirely vested in the
authorized operator in such a way as to be good against the
world, including the lessor; that the operation thereof must
be conducted under the supervision and control of such
carrier; that the vehicle must be operated by persons who
are employees of the authorized operator, that is to say, who
stand in the relation of servant to him as master."
The ruling as thus promulgated in 1936 was tentative and
provisional, pending decision upon the subject by the Interstate
Commerce Commission. It was modified by the Commission on
August 9, 1939, in the Dixie Ohio Express case,4 wherein the
ruling was rephrased as follows (at 17 M. C. C. 752):
"The lease or other arrangement under which the carrier utilizes in its operations a vehicle which it does not
own, whether or not including the services of an ownerdriver or his representative, must be of such a character
that the carrier will have the right to direct and control the
operation of the vehicle at all times and be fully responsible
therefor in all respects under all applicable provisions of
law governing the duties and obligations of the carrier to
the shipper and to the public generally."
In explanation of the rephrased rule the Commission said
(p. 752):
"It is clear that a motor carrier cannot, by utilizing in
its operations a vehicle which it does not own and the
services of the owner, divest itself of any of its duties under
the Motor Carrier Act or in any way defeat our powers of
regulation thereunder. For the future, so far as the rates
charged and the service furnished are concerned, and also
security for the protection of the public . . . or any other
duty imposed by or under the act, the carriermust be fully
responsible for the operation of the vehicle."
It follows that so far as the public is concerned, any attempt
by the carrier to divest itself of the right of control, and any
attempt by the carrier to shift responsibility to the owner4

Application of Dixie Ohio Express, 17 Motor Carrier Cases 735 (1939).
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driver-lessor, is contrary to public policy, contrary to the Motor
Carrier Act, and void. On any transportation project of the
certificate holder, the certified carrier is liable to the general
public irrespective of the details of the lease contract with the
owner or driver.5
Some difficulty arises in determining what movements of
the leased equipment are within the scope of the general transportation project of the carrier. It is sometimes contended that
empty movements from the delivery point back to the home
terminal are the responsibility of the owner-operator, not the
carrier.
The leading case on this point is United Truck Lines, Inc.,
Transfer of Empty Equipment, Application No. MC 7746.6
United Truck Lines had a franchise between Portland and
Spokane, and between Seattle and Spokane. It had no franchise
between Portland and Seattle. The three cities are situated at
three points of a triangle. Occasionally it would pile up too
many of its trucks at Seattle (or Portland) and would want to
move them only 200 miles to Portland (or Seattle) over the
short leg of the triangle. If it had to move them around the two
long legs of the triangle, from Portland to Spokane to Seattle, or
from Seattle through Spokane to Portland, the trip would take
700 miles.
The Commission held that even empty or deadheading, the
trucks had to be moved over the 700 mile certificated route
rather than over the 200 mile direct route; but the Commission,
on application, extended United's franchise to certificate the
truck movements, empty only, from Seattle to Portland and
from Portland to Seattle.
To like effect is Application of Wasie, Common Carrier Application No. MC 76,266. 7 The applicant operated empty trucks
between two points in a single state to the interstate loading
terminal, the trucks ultimately to be used in interstate shipments. The Commission held:
"The empty movement of these vehicles clearly falls
within this definition of the services and transportation
subject to the Act, and consequently authority from us
therefor is necessary." (Sec. 203 (a) (19).)
5 Venuto v. Robinson, 118 F. 2d 679 (C. C. A. 3, N. J., 1941).
6 United Truck Lines, Inc., 3 Federal Carrier Cases 188, Paragraph 30,218.
7

Application of Wasie, 1 Federal Carrier Cases 187, Paragraph No. 7201.
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The same rule was announced in Motor Rail Co., Common
Carrier Application No. MC 87,035,8 where the Commission held:
"Empty equipment movements in connection with, or
incidental to, transportation of property in interstate or
foreign commerce, requires appropriate authority from this
commission."
9
The rule was reaffirmed in ConsolidatedFreightLines, Inc.,
Common Carrier Application, wherein the Commission held:
"The movement of empty equipment as an incident to
the transportation of goods in interstate or foreign commerce is a transportationservice subject to the act and to
our requirements for operating authority, even though the
empty movements are wholly within one state."
In determining liability for empty movements, both the
type of lease and the type of operation becomes important. If
the owner-operator enters into a single trip lease which by its
terms terminates upon delivery of the cargo to the consignee or
at the foreign terminal, and the owner-operator is then free to
go to any other carrier and negotiate for a succeeding trip lease,
the empty movement in search of another lease is not within the
transportation service of the original carrier-lessee.' 0
It may be, however, that a course of conduct has developed
in which the owner-lessor uniformly trip-leases for a particular
run from one city to another, and uniformly returns empty to
the original carrier's terminal to trip-lease again for the same
journey. Where this uniform pattern obtains, the Court may
look behind the trip-lease form to hold that the arrangement
amounts to permanent lease, so that the empty return trip to
the terminal is contemplated by the parties as a necessary incident to the outgoing loaded movement. In such situation, the
carrier is liable for the operation of the equipment on the empty
return movement, even though the loaded movement goes out
under the trip-lease form.1
A further complication sometimes arises. If the carrier's
operations are not balanced between different terminals, the
driver may find no return load waiting for him. This is particularly true in steel hauling, where it would be unusual to
have as much. steel come in to a mill town as is shipped out.
8 Motor Rail Co., 4 Federal Carrier Cases 36, Paragraph 30,048.
9 Consolidated Freight Lines, Inc., 11 Motor Carrier Cases, 131 at 133.
10 Costello v. Smith, 179 F. 2d 715 (C. A. 2, Conn., 1949).
11 Hodges v. Johnson, 52 F. Supp. 488 (D. C., W. Va., 1943).
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Since the drivers are paid a percentage of the revenue, the
empty return movement is uncompensated. The owner-operator
cannot economically run half of his mileage empty and unpaid.
It has become common practice for the owner-operator to enter
into long term lease with the carrier at a particular home terminal, run loaded from that point to one of the various delivery
terminals, and then trip-lease with any other carrier with available load going in the general direction of the home terminal. On
the trip-lease run, the permanent decals and licenses of the long
term lessee are covered over with the temporary placards of the
single trip lessee. Upon delivery, the temporary placards are
removed and the outfit, again emblazoned with the decals of the
long term lessee, heads back to the home terminal.
If collision occurs while on the loaded trip-lease movement,
the liability for the driver's conduct clearly rests with the triplessee carrier. But if collision occurs on the empty run while
the operator is deadheading back to the home terminal of the
long term lessee, where does liability rest?
The long term lessee will claim that the trip-lease was a
complete departure or deviation from its business, and will seek
to disclaim liability for the driver while on "a frolic of his own,"
until he has actually reached the home terminal.
It should be observed that in these cases the trip-lease movement is not unauthorized and not in defiance of the long term
lessee's orders. The owner-operator trip-leases because he must
do it for economic survival, and it is not difficult to establish
from the carrier's records and the testimony of the drivers and
dispatchers that either the carrier has given express approval
to the practice, or has full knowledge of the practice and has
acquiesced in it.
The public policy question is strong. The certificated carrier is enfranchised to make the loaded haul under the restriction of many safeguards designed to protect the public, including, among other things, minimum financial responsibility provisions. It is contemplated that empty return movements will
be an essential part of the transportation project, and will be
made with the same protection to the public.
If the operator makes a direct empty return, the carrier is
responsible. If he makes his return partly under trip-lease and
partly empty, should riot the empty return to home terminal
still be made with the same restrictions to safeguard the public?
The empty phase of the final return movement may be from a
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different direction, to be sure, but is likely to be of shorter
duration. Policy considerations would seem to indicate that
liability for the operator should attach as soon as the trip-lease
terminates.
Logic would lead to the same conclusion. The operator is
under the overriding control of the long term lease. He deviates
from the mission of the long term lessee, but with his acquiescence. As soon as the deviation ends, he is again subject to the
overriding control of the long term lessee, which had been suspended by the trip-lease.
The leading case on this point is Marriott, et al. v. National
Mutual Casualty Co., et al.12 There the owner-operator delivered
his load for his long term lessee, found no return load available,
drove to another city where he trip-leased to another carrier,
completed that trip, and then started back empty to the original
terminal. While on this empty return movement, collision occurred. Held, the empty return trip after completion of the
trip-lease was a necessary incident to the transportation service
of the long term lessee, and that the carrier was liable.
It must not be assumed that the long term carrier will
always be liable. The principle herein discussed only serves
to make the driver the servant of the long term leasing carrier
except during the actual course of the trip-lease deviation.
The driver, as a servant, may nevertheless depart completely from the course and scope of his employment to go on
a purely personal frolic of his own, and create new problems as
to when he re-enters the course and scope of his employment.
13
Simon v. McCullough Transfer Co.

Even though the servant were on a mission of his own, the
carrier might be liable if he were an incompetent driver. Williamson v. Eclipse Motor Lines.14 If the driver should have been
known to the carrier as incompetent, then liability follows his
conduct even if he departs from course and scope, since the
actionable negligence consists of the act of entrustment which
necessarily occurs during the course and scope of the employment. In this respect the Interstate Commerce Commission
regulations prescribing minimum age and minimum standards
Marriott v. National Mutual Casualty Co., 195 F. 2d 462 (C. A. 10, Kans.,
1952).
13 Simon v. McCullough Transfer Co., 155 Ohio St. 104, 98 N. E. 2d 19 (1951).
14 Williamson v. Eclipse Motor Lines, 145 Ohio St. 467, 62 N. E. 2d 339
(1945).
12
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of both skill and experience with the particular type of equipment involved should be remembered.
A further refinement of the agency doctrine exists in Ohio.
It may be that the mission of the driver is not such as to be part
of the transportation business of the carrier. Suppose that the
owner-operator has leased his outfit under the usual provision
that the owner must provide all maintenance. At a time during
the term of the lease, after completing a trip, the driver returns
his outfit to his home and decides that his tractor should be repaired before going out on another trip. He drives the tractor
to a repair shop in another city. Later, after repair, he is driving
it to his home, where it would in normal course be coupled to the
trailer for subsequent report to the terminal and loading. If
collision occurs while he is driving it from the repair shop to
his home, is the carrier liable?
The answer is not settled by the Federal Cases for carriers
operating under I. C. C. permits. The repair of the vehicle might
well be deemed a necessary incident to the transportation business of the carrier, so that even this type of empty movement
would be deemed to be under the permits with the driver a
servant of the carrier. In Ohio, under P. U. C. 0. permits, the
driver would not be a servant of the carrier, but would nevertheless be covered by the insurance policies filed by the carrier
with the Commission. The Commission requires that the liability
policies of insurance filed with it, to comply with the minimum
financial responsibility standards, must contain a form of endorsement which insures not only the carrier, but also the lessorowner and the driver of leased equipment while operating the
vehicle in motor transportation service. The courts give this
endorsement a liberal construction in order to safeguard the
public, and hold that the test of coverage is not whether the
conduct is in the course and scope of employment, but whether
it may be deemed reasonably incidental to the practical necessities of running a motor carrier service. 15 Driving the tractor
from a repair shop to the owner's home was held to be incidental
to the transportation service. 16
In such case it is of course necessary that the plaintiff bring
his action directly against the driver, rather than against the
carrier. The effect of the policy endorsement is not to extend
15 Mitchell v. Great Eastern Stages, Inc., 140 Ohio St. 137, 42 N. E. 2d 771
(1942).
16 Woods v. Vona, 147 Ohio St. 91, 68 N. E. 2d 80 (1946).
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the liability of the carrier, but rather to extend the coverage of
the insurance to the driver.
The above considerations would emphasize the wisdom, in
all carrier cases where the slightest doubt exists on agency
questions, of making early and exhaustive investigation of all
the circumstances, so that proper action against the proper defendant may be instituted before the bar of the Statute of Limitations falls.
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